TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/060490/0604990.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 43.9 KB | 928 lines

                                                                                THE SUMMIT, Page 27

COVER STORIES

Gorbachev Interview: "I AM AN OPTIMIST"


Expressing impatience toward his critics and advice for foreign
heads of state, Gorbachev sees himself as the leader of a new
revolution and a visionary for the end of the century

By Mikhail Gorbachev


    After greeting his visitors from TIME, Mikhail Gorbachev
observed that since he had already prepared written answers to
a list of questions submitted in advance, "there's really no
need to waste any more time or paper." He gave a hearty laugh,
then invited the group to join him at a small oval conference
table in the corner of his office and, without ceremony,
launched into the subject that is most on his mind these days
-- the domestic economy.


    I've just come from a meeting of the Presidential Council.
We were discussing radical measures for the reform of our
economy. At this point we need only a short period of time, a
few months, to take some important steps that, in essence, will
mean the transition to a regulated market economy. In Russian
that word, regulated, is difficult to pronounce. It's even more
difficult to accomplish.

    In many countries the development of a full-fledged market
economy has taken centuries. For us the next year or two will
be the most intensive stage of the transition. Shortly, Prime
Minister Ryzhkov will report to the Supreme Soviet on the basis
of the discussion and analysis that we've just had in the
Presidential Council.

    To put it briefly, what we're talking about is a shift in
direction comparable in magnitude to the October Revolution,
because we will be replacing one economic and political model
with another.

    Often people ask where we are going, whether we are
retreating from socialism or moving toward socialism. As we
move along this path, our point of departure is to make good
on the potential of the socialist idea. The very fact that I'm
saying this is further proof that I'm a convinced socialist.
I think in the questions you sent me, you were probing my
ideological positions. Well, I am a communist. I'm sure that
answer doesn't make you too enthusiastic, but it shouldn't make
you panic either. It's quite normal.


    Q. You compare your economic reform to the October
Revolution. The revolution came as a great shock to your
society.

    A. This will be a shock. But not a Polish one.

    We have given careful thought about which way to go. One
alternative was shock therapy. Instead we have decided to
proceed radically, but on the basis of the special
characteristics of our economy. Most Western economists believe
we're doing the right thing. We can't just follow someone
else's model automatically. There was a time when we tried to
impose our model on others. It would be a disaster if we just
borrowed blindly another country's model. That's why we think
we should take a radical path but without shocks.


    Q. But you said you were going to accomplish all this in a
year or two.

    A. That's for the transition. It will take one or two years
to introduce the market mechanisms and the infrastructure. But
then it will take a long time to develop a real market economy.
First we have to adopt and implement various laws on taxes,
enterprise, antitrust, credit, finance and social protection
-- the safety net -- all within the context of a market
economy.


    Q. And private property?

    A. Well, life will show us. I wouldn't rule it out. We'll
be phasing out state property and establishing shareholder
companies, leasehold properties, cooperative enterprises and
individual employment. Broadly speaking, self-employed people
will include those who work in their own shops or on their own
plots of land. In developed Western countries, there are
various concepts of a market economy. For example, there is a
more liberal approach in the U.S., while in some European
countries, such as France and Scandinavia, there is more
government regulation; a significant portion of the economy is
publicly owned. But even there, everything operates within the
framework of a market.


    Q. Most Soviet and Western economists warn that you can't
have radical reform of the Soviet economy without inflation and
unemployment -- and probably large amounts of each.

    A. I think both things will happen. You should bear in mind
that we have quite a few factories in the Soviet Union that are
simply inefficient. They're going to have to reorient their
production. People will have to be retrained. Many will have
to find new occupations. That's why we are establishing a
system of social protection that will enable these people to
make the transition. In America and other developed Western
countries, most people are employed in the services sector,
while two-thirds of our people are in the production sector.
We've got a lot of work ahead of us to expand jobs in the
services sector. We'll be looking at other countries as we
decide which way to go. We feel ourselves part of a global
civilization, and we want to be organically included in the
entire world economically.

    At the same time, however, it would be an [environmental]
catastrophe if all the countries of the world tried to achieve
the standard of living of the U.S. America already consumes a
disproportionate percentage of the world's energy resources.
That's why I stress the conflict between consumer society and
nature.


    Q. But it seems that many people in your country are
concerned not with the conflict between nature and progress but
with the absence of progress itself; they're not sure whether
you can deliver on improved living standards.

    A. You'd be mistaken if you think people are not troubled
by the environment, by the conflict between industry and
nature. Their concerns have caused 1,000 factories to be shut
down. The result has been the loss of 10 billion rubles' worth
of production. Just look at the Congress of the Russian
Federation, which is debating the question of sovereignty. Many
speakers are defining sovereignty precisely in terms of how
most efficiently to use the resources of the republic.

    Of course you're right that technological progress has
stimulated the search for new forms of economic management and
organization. The old system rejected technological
achievement. Now, by making the transition to market
mechanisms, we're going to adopt state programs that stimulate
science and education, and we're also going to convert our
defense industries in a way that shifts our society onto the
path of scientific and economic progress.

    Perestroika has already awakened our people. They've
changed. We have a different society now. We will never slip
backward. There's still a question of whether the process will
go slower or faster, whether it will be more or less painful.
But we will certainly keep moving ahead. There might be certain
zigzags along the way. That's unavoidable when a country is
undergoing major changes. But the fact remains that this
change, perestroika, is a fitting conclusion to the 20th
century. It is an event that has engaged not only the Soviet
people but people throughout the world, including those from
societies quite different from ours.

    From a strategic standpoint, I'm pleased with what we have
accomplished. We've given a powerful impetus to the process of
new political thinking both within the Soviet Union and around
the world. Of course there are a lot of problems that are cause
for concern. In domestic affairs, we're troubled by
socioeconomic tensions that can be exploited by both the
extreme left and the extreme right. People with their own
agendas and ambitions are trying to mislead our society.

    In foreign policy, our biggest concern is with some
politicians who still think about international relations
mostly with respect to their own terms of office and electoral
ambitions at a time when we are trying to lay the foundations
for a new international community. Such politicians look for
partners who have the same incorrect approach. If people don't
understand what's most important, then there can be no genuine
international cooperation.


    Q. You say there is a danger of these concerns' being
exploited both from the right and from the left. Which is the
greater danger?

    A. The biggest danger would be a split among the supporters
of perestroika. We've got to solidify the main trend. We
understand those whom we call healthy conservatives, who
support a commonsense approach. We have to take into account
their doubts and concerns. We invite their cooperation. On the
left too there are people who are worried that perestroika is
not moving fast enough. Their hopes and concerns are quite
normal, and we must take account of them. What is very
dangerous is extremism. I'm thinking of the people I call the
crazies. These are the ones who pretend to be populists but who
don't really represent the people's interests at all.


    Q. You used the chilling phrase civil war when you were
recently on a visit to the Urals. In what sense does this
danger exist, and how can it be averted?

    A. I'm glad you asked, because I think the answer will be
of interest not just to the readers of TIME but to the Soviet
people as well. I have been personally criticized for being too
soft or too democratic. I don't know if it's possible to be too
democratic, but that's what is sometimes said. And I'm also
criticized for being indecisive. Some people are nostalgic for
the past. I think we should move along the path we have chosen,
which is the path of developing and expanding the processes of
democratization and glasnost. We are committed to that. We'll
be guided on that path by the rule of law. That means there
should be one law for everyone; everyone should be equal before
the law. Nor should we yield to pressure from those who would
like us to tighten the screws, as they put it. Of course we'll
find some screws loose, and they will have to be tightened. But
repression, witch-hunts, the search for enemies -- all that is
unacceptable. It's not what we want, and it's not what our
people want.

    What I have to do is use my personal authority and my
political powers as President to speed up our progress toward
becoming a state fully governed by the rule of law. That won't
be easy. In these politically charged times and in this
turbulent society, overburdened as it is with all kinds of
problems, some people are trying to fuel the flames and light
the fuses. There's no question that these extremists exist. We
should not ignore their activities. It's because of them that
we've had bloodshed in some parts of our country, particularly
in the form of ethnic conflict.

    We should take advantage of the chance we have to bring
about real change and to build a democratic country based on
the rule of law, a real civil society.


    Q. We must ask you about the Baltics, secession and
nationalism.

    A. As far as separatism is concerned, I've already answered.
As for my view on the development of our federation, I'm
speaking about the Baltics almost every day. We're seeking a
political solution, and we're doing so precisely at this
moment. As President, I took an oath of office to uphold the
constitution. Certain anticonstitutional developments are
taking place. They began just as we started our Congress of
People's Deputies. The congress considered the situation,
declared the decisions of the Lithuanian parliament illegal and
instructed me as President to uphold the constitution. As I
said to Senator [George] Mitchell [the majority leader] when
he visited me [last April], if an American President had been
given that task, he probably would have accomplished it in 24
hours. But it's not like that here. For us the presidency is
a new experience.

    We really hope to find a solution to this extremely
sensitive issue within the framework of our constitution. We
are looking for a way to restore constitutional order and
authority, and to do so by political means. Let me just stop
there, particularly because recently we've seen some new and
encouraging signs.


    Q. Do you expect a major disagreement with President Bush
about a united Germany's being in NATO?

    A. I wouldn't say I expect a major disagreement -- I'll
state for a fact that there will be one. But I do expect the
differences to be narrowed as a result of my discussions with
President Bush. I hope the character of the relationship I've
developed with the President will permit us to move forward
rather than backward in our discussions. When two partners
meet, each side has its own interests to look after, and the
other side must take that into account. The main thing is to
find as much harmony as possible between the two sides'
positions. If, in any area of Soviet foreign policy, we're
doing something that damages the interests of the U.S., then
that policy cannot be successful. If, however, we're able to
establish a better balance in our relations with the U.S., then
both sides can achieve their ends.

    In foreign policy too we have to get rid of the
command-administrative system [jargon for dictatorial rule].
There's no other choice. It's the imperative of our time.


    Q. Looking at the things that have happened in Eastern
Europe and in your own country in the past few years, many
Americans wonder whether you had any idea of what was going to
happen, if it was part of your plans, or whether you have been
as surprised by events as we have been.

    A. I had an idea -- an idea to change our society on the
inside and also to change what is going on outside, around our
country, and to do so on the basis of new realities. But when
people speak to me about various models and timetables, as
though all this had happened according to a train schedule, I
can only smile. I recently spoke to party members in the
electoral district where I was elected to the 28th Party
Congress [scheduled to take place this summer]. I told my
listeners: If anyone says to you there are simple solutions to
our problems, if anyone promises that such a thing exists, then
that person is nothing but a con artist; he's out to deceive
you. At such turning points in history, all sorts of people
come forward in the political, economic and cultural arenas.
Some are just a bit strange, while others are downright
dangerous. It's important to know which kind you're dealing
with. No one will announce that he is out to destroy society
or that he is against the interests of the people; he will bare
his chest and claim to be marching under the banner of
revolution and the people's interests. But people are beginning
to see things more clearly. They know who their real friends
are. They're giving credit where it's due -- to those who are
genuinely devoted to perestroika and to this tough challenge
we face.

    This is really a very demanding time for all of us. We have
to look at things carefully; we have to analyze where we are
and anticipate where we are going as we move forward to a new
society.

    I am an optimist.


    Q. How can you be so relaxed for someone who faces such huge
problems?

    A. My confidence comes from knowing that what we're doing
is right and necessary. Otherwise, I wouldn't be able to bear
the burden.

   [During the interview, Gorbachev handed across the table a
typewritten document with his signature on the first page. It
contained his dictated answers to these questions submitted
several weeks earlier.]


    Q. Some fear that Newtonian physics governs superpower
relations: What goes up must come down. They warn that our
countries' interaction has in the past been prone to wild
swings between euphoria and depression, cooperation and
conflict, thaw and chill. Do you see any such danger? How can
we avoid such cycles? How can the recent progress be made
permanent?

    A. I do not believe that any relentless "law of the cycles"
exists in relations between our two countries or in
international affairs generally. Everything is in human hands,
primarily of course in the hands of policymakers.

    In the past, when the entire infrastructure of confrontation
-- from ideological intransigence to the arms race as the
mainstay of security policy -- was still intact, fluctuations
and even abrupt swings were probably inevitable in our
relations.

    A return to where we were yesterday is hardly possible now,
if only because politicians have become quite well aware of the
integrity and interdependence of our world. And also because
there is little chance that either side could revive the "enemy
image" that used to fuel the cold war and confrontation.

    We have come to understand clearly our own best interests
and present-day world realities. We have learned too much about
each other to be able to revert to old preconceptions and
ideological cliches. Besides, if the Soviet Union and the U.S.
are to keep their relations on the basis of reason, they simply
cannot afford confrontation with each other. Each simply has
too many immense, crucial problems, and there are global
threats looming over the entire human race.

    As President of my country, I obviously protect the
interests of the U.S.S.R. Yet I also have concern and respect
for the legitimate interests of the U.S. I try to understand
what worries the Americans. If both sides take this approach,
we will be able to accomplish a great deal and make steady and
continuous progress in our relations.

    New steps forward are the best guarantee against backsliding
-- in arms reductions, which still cannot keep pace with
political changes; in our cooperation on transnational
problems; in economic, scientific, technological and cultural
exchanges; and in simple human contacts among people of
different generations and occupations.


    Q. What are the most important themes to have emerged in the
past several years?

    A. Everyone remembers where we stood in the mid-'80s. The
arms race was gathering momentum. The nations of the Third
World were in a terrible plight. Regional conflicts constantly
threatened to get out of control. Enmity kept the world
permanently disturbed and waiting for disaster, for global
explosions.

    So looking back on those years, I see a number of major
changes in people's minds and on the political scene.

    First, the bankruptcy of militarism and its dangers have
become more obvious. Attitudes toward war and military power
as instruments of state policy have changed. People have begun
to realize that the earth is getting too small for wars and
that they have to put an end to the spiraling arms race. The
burden of today's military spending has proved too heavy even
for rich nations such as the U.S. To sum up, toward the end of
the 1980s there appeared a glimmer of hope that the global
political process could be demilitarized.

    Second, it was during the 1980s that mankind for the first
time seriously began to think in ecological terms. The need for
radically reassessing the relationship between mankind and the
planet was made manifest by Chernobyl, acid rain, ozone-layer
depletion, the greenhouse effect, vanishing forests and
freshwater shortages. The ecological movement is now on the
rise. Government policies are beginning to change.
International ecological cooperation has begun. Yet it will take
a tremendous effort to overcome the inertia of mindless
devastation of the environment, or even restrain the inertia
generated by the industrial era.

    Third, and this is related to the first two points, there
is a greater awareness now that the countries and peoples of
the East, the West, the North and the South -- however
different their social systems and levels of development, and
however dissimilar their cultures, beliefs and ideologies --
are parts of a single world and have basic, vital interests in
common. These elements of unity and this new social
self-awareness form the foundation on which modern world
politics should be built. And this is already happening.

    Fourth, the 1980s marked a major watershed in the history
of the Soviet Union. The logic of life confronted us with the
need for profound changes in the context of our socialist
choice. Hence our perestroika. For our people, progress is
inconceivable without the socialist idea. Hence also the
powerful tendency toward democratic change here. Hence too the
new thinking in foreign policy. Changes inside the U.S.S.R.
have had a profound impact on world developments; there is a new
international situation, with greater prospects for a period
of peace in the development of civilization and vast
opportunities for a better life for people everywhere.

    We continue to back up our new philosophy with deeds, with
action, with the force of example. Perestroika and new thinking
are inseparable.

    Fifth, after the Soviet Union, the democratic tide has swept
other countries, especially those with closer ties to us.
Naturally, developments took a different course in each of
these countries. But they also had a common logic, with a
dramatic increase in the social and political activity of
citizens seeking to gain genuine control over their lives and
the policies of their governments.

    Whether these developments are to bring about true progress
and real innovation will depend on how firmly we establish in
world politics the principles of freedom of choice and the
renunciation of force, which does not mean just military force.
As far as we in the Soviet Union are concerned, this matter has
been settled once and for all. But others still seem to be
tempted to resort to old methods and confrontational
approaches, where one side's victory is another's defeat.

    New thinking does not come easily. It turns out that one
must learn it the hard way, as I see both in my own country and
in the U.S.

    Summarizing the essence of the historic turn that occurred
in the 1980s, I would say this: within a very short span of
time, people have begun to regain hope for a better future.


    Q. More specifically, what are the most important changes
since you were last in Washington for your summit meeting with
former President Reagan in December 1987?

    A. Over these 2 1/2 years, relations between our two
countries have changed in a fundamental way. A mutual
understanding has emerged that the cold war has become a thing
of the past. And a great deal has been done to make that really
happen. We have started to build a relationship on a new basis.
We've agreed that the disputes between us can be resolved and,
furthermore, that those disputes are less significant than the
new challenges that confront mankind. As a result, a process
of actually reducing nuclear and conventional arms has become
possible and is now under way. Regional conflicts have become
a subject on which we can work constructively together.

    Our ties have grown noticeably in such areas as science,
education and culture, and particularly in informal human
contacts. We have increased the flow of all kinds of
information about each other in both directions, and it is
becoming more objective.

    It's necessary to protect and augment what has been
accomplished in Soviet-U.S. relations. We live in dramatic
times. Events can take sharp and unexpected turns. That makes
it all the more dangerous to have in our minds the stereotypes
of the cold war. Yet those stereotypes are still alive. Let me
put it this way: the strength of our relationship is being
tested, and it will be tested again in the future. We should
keep that in mind.

    In my assessment, President Bush and I have come to trust
each other more since our discussions at Malta. Contacts that
followed between the Kremlin and the White House support this
conclusion.


    Q. How would you judge public support today for what you are
trying to do?

    A. I have recently been to the Urals, and I have met with
working people in Moscow many times in their workplaces, in the
streets and at mass gatherings. People speak candidly,
critically and sometimes even sharply. But the need for
perestroika is rarely questioned. People are saying, Don't
delay decisions, don't be content with half measures -- act
pre-emptively. And they're right.

    Frankly, as our society was groping for a way out of the
twilight of stagnation, it took us some time to become aware
of the depths of the crisis. Today everyone is working against
the clock. But we have already climbed a long, steep slope
since the spring of 1985 [when Gorbachev assumed power]. We did
not do all that just to roll downhill again. Those five years
have not been lost. We have gained experience; we have new
knowledge, which we lacked at the first stage of perestroika.
We have become wiser, we have learned to take a more reasoned
and competent approach to the fundamental tasks of perestroika.
So some preparatory phase -- what I would call a phase of
quantitative accumulation -- was inevitable and necessary.
What's more, it has persuaded us that, in principle, we are on
the right track.

    New, all-embracing democratic structures are coming to
replace the command system in managing the country's affairs.
We have made headway in dismantling monopolies both in politics
and in the economy. At the party congress we're going to have
to discuss quite thoroughly how the party is to act in a
situation of real political pluralism, how it is going to fit
into a multiparty system. This is going to be an important
task, crucial to the future both of the party and of the
country.

    The Communist Party was not just part of the superstructure
of the command system -- it was its nerve center. Therefore the
party bears the stamp of all the flaws of that system. That's
why today it comes in for a lot of sharp criticism, including
often unfair attacks. The party has embarked on the path of
profound self-reformation. It is making itself much more
democratic. This will enable it to be revived as a powerful,
organized political force, a force that our society and people
need, and that will help to move perestroika forward and bring
people together. That's particularly important at a time when
the decentralization of state control coincides with some
centrifugal tendencies.

    We have sorted out our economic affairs and seen the depth
of the crisis caused by the command system. We have tried some
new methods of economic management. A few times, we burned our
fingers, but even that has taught us some lessons. We've made
our choice, without reservation. A few months, maybe a year,
will decide everything. We shall rely on a variety of forms of
property and real autonomy, along with entrepreneurial risk and
initiative, for the producers. We'll put an end to the rule of
government agencies. Once the economic reform really gets under
way and millions of people become aware of their places in the
new order and pitch in vigorously, they'll become more
optimistic and confident of their future.

    The Soviet Union is a rich country. It has unique natural
resources, a powerful production base, advanced science and a
talented people. More radical reform will enable us to address
our social problems better, to live up to the expectations of
our people and to realize the potential of our country, both
for its own welfare and that of the rest of the world.


    Q. Would you elaborate for us on your vision of a Soviet
federation and how it would be different from the Soviet Union
in its present form?

    A. Democratization and glasnost have led to a rapid process
of national revival. In principle, it is a positive process,
but it has also brought selfish nationalistic tendencies to the
surface. Events in the Baltics, the Caucasus and elsewhere have
caused concern abroad as well as within our country. A solution
to this truly historic problem can be found, and we are coming
closer to it. We still prefer the term union to confederation,
although it is certainly true that certain confederative
elements might be used.

    When the U.S.S.R. was born, there was a heated debate. Lenin
was of the view that the Union should be a federation of equal
republics, while Stalin in effect favored a unitary state.
Lenin's approach was formally adopted in 1922, but in real life
things turned out quite differently. It's only now that we are
beginning to create a new Union in the original sense of that
concept. A truly democratic multinational state and the
progress of perestroika are mutually interdependent; each
depends very much on the other.

    You ask how a new Union would differ from what we have now.
There should be real sovereignty for the republics in all
spheres of their life. That means a degree of freedom that
would enable every people to feel that it is in full control
of its land, to protect its roots and its language, and to
develop its national culture in a comprehensive way. There
should be qualitatively new relations between the republics and
the center, and also among individual republics.


    Q. You are a Russian as well as a Soviet citizen; how does
this aspect of your identity and background influence your
thinking about the future of your country?

    A. My awareness of myself as a Russian and, at the same
time, as a Soviet is quite natural for me. This is equally true
for millions of my countrymen. I was brought up within Russian
culture and Russian traditions, but that just makes it all the
easier for me to be an internationalist. That's because Russian
culture and what is called "the Russian idea" are remarkably
receptive to the national heritage of other peoples. Both in
past centuries and in the Soviet period, the Russian people
have demonstrated an inclination toward friendship and
cooperation with other nations. But our people have also
demonstrated their unselfish responsibility for the integrity
of the country as a whole, which history has shaped into a
multinational entity. Russians have that heritage in their
blood, in their genes, regardless of their political views or
philosophy.

    Many things happened in the past, including distortions of
the nationalities policy. There was even imperial oppression
of various nationalities as well as attempts to Russify other
peoples. But that wasn't the fault of the Russian people
themselves. They have a clear conscience. What is more, they
often sacrificed what they had in order to help others,
particularly smaller peoples.

    I might add that the interests of all the peoples of our
country are important to me. I cannot conceive of a moral
policy without internationalism. I am outraged by any
chauvinism, any nationalism, any lack of respect for the
character and traditions of any nation.


    Q. You have repeatedly called for a "common European home."
President Bush calls for a "Europe whole and free." What do you
see as the differences -- and the similarities -- between your
view and his?

    A. I believe that both phrases strike a similar note. So
does President [Francois] Mitterrand's idea of a European
confederation. My own vision comes down to this: not only
should military confrontation between the alliances come to an
end, but alliance-based coexistence should become a thing of
the past. The process of European and global integration, which
is already so promising, would gradually create a new economic
environment. Politically, we are already entering a new phase
that should be characterized by the establishment of permanent
security structures instead of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty
Organization.

    I envision Europe as a union of states with common
institutions to assure military and environmental security,
along with cooperation in science and culture. Each state would
retain its local and national character and have the right to
protect its special interests without prejudice to others.
Borders must remain inviolable, but they should also acquire
a new quality of openness, permitting all kinds of cooperation
and communication, as long as it is based on equity and mutual
respect.

    You ask how my approach differs from that of President Bush.
Indeed, there are some differences. According to the American
scenario, as far as I can tell, NATO -- and that means a NATO
strengthened by the inclusion of a united Germany -- should be
the foreman and guarantor in the building of a new European
order.

    I can understand that Americans and many Europeans have
their own perception of this organization. They give it credit
for keeping peace throughout the cold war. On that basis, we
are being told that the role of NATO, in the new phase as well,
will be entirely positive and will even serve the interests of
the Soviet Union. But that's just not serious. For our people
too, NATO is associated with the cold war -- but as an
organization designed from the start to be hostile to the
Soviet Union, as a force that whipped up the arms race and the
danger of war. Regardless of what is being said about NATO now,
for us it is a symbol of the past, a dangerous and
confrontational past. And we will never agree to assign it the
leading role in building a new Europe. I want us to be
understood correctly on this.

    We have in mind an alternative approach. One key element
would be to institutionalize European development and establish
totally new structures on a Pan-European basis, naturally with
the U.S. and Canada actively involved. Another would be to
synchronize the political and disarmament processes with the
pace of German unification, or at least link them as closely
as possible. Incidentally, in our view, this synchronization
is one of the main functions of the "two plus four" mechanism
[the current negotiations among the wartime Allies  -- the U.S.,
Britain, France and the Soviet Union -- plus the two Germanys].

    Another point of difference we have with the American
viewpoint concerns the issue of foreign military presence in
Europe. We are ready to bring our own soldiers home. We're
already doing so. The U.S. Administration assumes that Soviet
troops on foreign territory are an absolute evil while American
troops are always good. Therefore the Americans are looking for
any pretext to delay their departure.


    Q. Would you elaborate on your view of German unification?

    A. We accept that there will be a unified German state in
Europe. That is the natural right of the German nation. But let
me remind the Germans that the unification of the two Germanys
concerns not only them. It is pivotal to the entire European
process; it affects the vital interests of many countries in
Europe, including the Soviet Union, which sacrificed more than
anyone to make sure that war should never again come from
German territory. Not even the most sincere assurances given
now, in this headlong rush, can substitute for solid
international guarantees that Germany will always pursue
peaceful development and peaceful policies toward other
countries.

    One final point on this subject: it sometimes seems to me
that some in the West pretend to be more enthusiastic about
German unification than they really are. They even hope to use
us to put a brake on unification, so that we will get the blame
and end up at loggerheads with the Germans.


    Q. In the wake of the elections in Eastern Europe, why do
you believe so many citizens who have experienced communism for
four decades now seem to be rejecting that philosophy and
political system?

    A. Well, they don't just "seem" to be rejecting that system
-- they are rejecting it. But what they are rejecting is the
lack of freedom; they're rejecting a system that has done
violence to their national character and national rights;
they're rejecting ossified ways of thinking. When a society
breaks dramatically with the past, when former idols and heroes
are overthrown, it's like a dust storm. It's difficult to see
what will emerge in the end. I'm convinced that the radical
changes in Central and Eastern Europe in no way signal "the
collapse of socialism." Genuine socialist values will not sink
into oblivion. Even in the present environment of turbulent
change they assert their right to exist.

    I believe our relations with the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe will undoubtedly become richer, more honest and
more substantial -- to the benefit of us all.


    Q. What is your vision of the next century and of the role
of the Soviet Union in it?

    A. What the 21st century will be like depends on whether we
learn the lessons of the 20th century and avoid repeating its
worst mistakes. In my view, one of the principal lessons is
that the end, no matter how noble and attractive it may seem,
never justifies indiscriminate means. On the contrary, the
means that we can choose, in the final analysis, either help
us to reach our goal, or distort that goal, or lead us in the
wrong direction altogether. For example, it would be disastrous
if we began to renew our entire system of social relations by
acting like a bull in a china shop.

    Another lesson we should have learned has to do with the
fate of the socialist idea. In the 20th century socialism has
gained millions of supporters. It has become a powerful factor
in the ideological and political debate, contributing to social
and political progress in many countries. Nowhere, however, has
the socialist idea been adequately put into practice. Socialism
is not an artificial model that can be imposed on society. Any
attempt to make people live, so to speak, according to a
timetable is not just a utopian fallacy -- it can lead to
intolerance and violence.

    Back at the time of the 1917 Revolution, there was a slogan
to the effect that socialism is the vital and creative endeavor
of the masses. Only now are we beginning to understand the real
meaning of those words. Only through democratization and
glasnost are we finally involving the individual and his
talents in a way that is socially creative.

    As we approach the end of the 20th century, we must
recognize that we are one civilization. This simple but
important truth should tell us a great deal about international
politics and international relations. There must be a balance
of interests; otherwise new upheavals await us. To accept the
idea of mutual security means abandoning the idea of "world
leadership," which implies supremacy over others.

    Then, too, we should be aware of the contradictory nature
of progress and of the conflict between consumerism and nature.


    I really don't even want to attempt a detailed forecast of
what will happen to the U.S.S.R. Our future will depend on the
present; where we end up will depend on how we come through
this extremely critical passage that we're making right now as
we introduce radical changes in our society, all in the context
of world civilization.

    We are only now really beginning to feel that perestroika
is a revolution. That is why some people are beginning to
panic. They shout about anarchy; they predict chaos, war, total
ruin and so on. They're intellectually unprepared for the kind
of major changes that are objectively necessary. That's one
reason I have recently stressed the role in perestroika of
science and education. They can help us change the mentality of
society and free ourselves from the grip of outdated,
sometimes fundamentally erroneous concepts of economics,
politics, culture, morality and philosophy. I'm thinking, for
example, about old egalitarian principles that reduce everyone
to the same level and old approaches to public wealth that
excessively stress the distribution of goods at the expense of
other considerations.

    No amount of agitation or propaganda can break those
shackles. Changing our mentality has turned out to be the
greatest problem for perestroika.

    The Soviet people have the strength to implement
perestroika. The success of perestroika will lead to a
fundamentally healthier international environment and therefore
to more favorable conditions for every country to address its
own problems better.

    I believe that in the 21st century the Soviet Union will be
a profoundly democratic state, and its economy will form an
important and integral part of a new global economy. I see a
society that has found a way to harmonize its relations with
nature. I see a country on the way to moral stability -- a
country that has revived its old spiritual values and enriched
them with new ones.


_________________________________________________________________
"I DETEST LIES"


    Q. Many have said that you are presiding over the
dismantlement of communism. What does it mean to be a communist
today, and what will it mean in years to come?

    A. I am now, just as I've always been, a convinced
communist. It's useless to deny the enormous and unique
contribution of Marx, Engels and Lenin to the history of social
thought and to modern civilization as a whole. They turned the
idea of socialism into a real force for progress. They bear no
responsibility for the distortions of that idea that occurred
when it was put into practice.

    To be communist, as I see it, means to not be afraid of what
is new, to reject obedience to any dogma, to think
independently, to submit one's thoughts and plans of action to
the test of morality and, through political action, to help
working people realize their hopes and aspirations and live up
to their abilities. I believe that to be a communist today
means first of all to be consistently democratic and to put
universal human values above everything else. It also means to
be able to identify with the vital interests of the people and
to understand the importance of the international and global
issues that define mankind's common destiny.

    At the same time, it is far from harmless to cling to
conclusions reached in a different historical period. Having
abandoned its political monopoly, the Communist Party should
work democratically for the consolidation of our society. It
must set its sights on profound, radical changes while still
pursuing the socialist goal we've chosen. What I value in
Marxist theory is the idea of constant movement and
development, and also its rigorous respect for the truth. I
detest lies, and I resent anyone who makes one-sided judgments
and pretends to have absolute knowledge about what is going to
happen and what should be done. The Stalinist model of
socialism should not be confused with true socialist theory.
As we dismantle the Stalinist system, we are not retreating
from socialism but are moving toward it.


_________________________________________________________________
AMERICAN HISTORY "IS INSTRUCTIVE"


    Q. In your speech before the U.N. General Assembly on Dec.
7, 1988, you singled out the French Revolution and the Russian
Revolution for the "powerful impact" they had on "the very
nature of history." Quite a few people -- and not just
Americans -- wondered why you omitted mention of the American
Revolution.

    A. It's not correct to conclude that we underestimate the
importance of the American Revolution. The history of the U.S.
is studied in our schools and universities. The American
struggle for independence, the Civil War against slavery and
for the unity of the nation -- all this is instructive; it's
an important and integral part of world history. Many Russian
democrats drew inspiration from the ideals of the American
Revolution. Lenin called it one of the few truly democratic
revolutions. The American Declaration of Independence is a
remarkable document. In the words of Marx, it's the first
declaration of human rights. As we build a democratic society
based on the rule of law, we study the democratic experience
of the American people with interest.

    Still, the wellspring of perestroika is in our own national
soil and our own history. That isn't to deny that some outside
factors also provided incentives for perestroika. We have
rejected once and for all the self-isolation in which we were
immersed for so long.